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Ancient Bonds, Contemporary Powers: Investigating the Causes of Center/
Periphery Conflict in the Russian Federation
Abstract
What are the real causes of conflict between the federal regions and central authority in the Russian
Federation? Why is it that some regions are compelled to act assertively towards Moscow, while others
are not? These questions are relevant for any actor concerned with Russian affairs; moreover, they
represent a critical debate for those who hope to bring aid to Russia’s struggling regional populations.
This research furthers the debate through a test of the two major schools of ethno-federal thought:
primordialism and bargaining theory. The study (1) identifies relevant variables, (2) constructs indices to
represent each of the theories, and (3) tests those indices for correlation with regional aggression. This
research shows that characteristics suggested by both primordialism and bargaining theory exert
influence on regional aggression; however, it also finds that bargaining theory more accurately explains
the behavior of Russian regions. In the end, this study concludes that ethnic differences, per se, do not
lead to center/periphery conflict in the Russian Federation.
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Ancient Bonds, Contemporary Powers:
Powers:
Investigating the Causes of
Center/Periphery Conflict in the Russian
Federation
Brett A. Strand
What are the real causes of conflict between the federal regions and central authority in the
Russian Federation? Why is it that some regions are compelled to act assertively towards Moscow, while
others are not? These questions are relevant for any actor concerned with Russian affairs; moreover, they
represent a critical debate for those who hope to bring aid to Russia’s struggling regional populations.
This research furthers the debate through a test of the two major schools of ethno-federal thought:
primordialism and bargaining theory. The study (1) identifies relevant variables, (2) constructs indices to
represent each of the theories, and (3) tests those indices for correlation with regional aggression. This
research shows that characteristics suggested by both primordialism and bargaining theory exert influence
on regional aggression; however, it also finds that bargaining theory more accurately explains the
behavior of Russian regions. In the end, this study concludes that ethnic differences, per se, do not lead to
center/periphery conflict in the Russian Federation.
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Federalism:
The Source of Russia’s Problems?
It is widely believed that the main threat to Russia’s long-term stability is the increasingly
autocratic behavior demonstrated by its central authority. However, any characterization of the
Russian state as a political body experiencing unchallenged pressure from the center is a gross
oversimplification. Differences in status and behavior have created a patchwork of diverse
regions, each taking a unique stance towards Moscow. Within this ambiguous power structure,
relations between the regions and central authority have varied widely. Several regions have felt
justified in acting aggressively towards the center and have thereby increased their power on both
the regional and national levels; conversely, a large number of regions have opted for more
cordial relations with Moscow.
Plainly stated, Russia is a highly dysfunctional federation and, as such, it should be seen
as a group of unique (and often irrational) actors rather than as a monolithic political unit. The
resulting instability prevents international actors from being able to reliably judge the long-term
potential of any individual federal unit.

Therefore, a frustrating dilemma exists for any

organization seeking to become active in Russian affairs: while it is necessary to confirm regional
stability before becoming active in the Russian Federation, there currently exists no reliable
method by which to assess the behavior of its federal units.
This study bases itself upon the premise that any assessment of regional stability should
begin with an analysis of center-periphery relations. More specifically, it posits that interested
parties ought to investigate a region’s potential for aggressive behavior. Such an investigation
will (1) assess the likelihood that a specific region will offend Moscow and face the inevitable
repercussions and (2) analyze the potential for such conflicts to accumulate and lead to the
unraveling of the Russian Federation, as they did in the USSR.
What causes certain federal regions to behave aggressively in their relations with
Moscow, while others remain amicable and agreeable to the center’s wishes? Why do some
ethnically based regions feel compelled to strike out against the central authority? Why do others
opt for more congenial relations with the center? And do the current political dysfunctions
threaten to cause a collapse of the Russian Federation, much like the one that consumed the
Soviet Union? By considering the predominate theories regarding ethno-federal relations and
testing the viability of each school as a predictor of regional aggression, this study will attempt to
clarify the rules by which Russian region’s behave and to which all interested parties must
therefore adhere.
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A Brief History of
Ethnicity & the Russian State
The Historical Context. For over a millennium, Russian rulers promoted the political
strength of the state over the ethnic value of its people. In doing so, they created a nation that
differs sharply from most other Western states. Modern states most often organized around a
specific ethnic identity; Russia, in contrast, gathered hundreds of different ethnic groups under a
single authority. In order to complete this task, the Russian government repeatedly adjusted its
policy towards minority cultures. Moreover, leaders occasionally redefined and manipulated the
concept of ethnicity in order to meet the goals of the state. The long-term effects of these actions
continue to be felt.
For the majority of the second millennium, Russia existed as an imperial state. As such,
its borders expanded and contracted quite frequently; it was constantly overtaking and
abandoning regional ethnic groups. In order to preserve this ever-changing body, identity was
defined as a function of the state rather than of regional culture. Ethnic groups residing within the
borders of imperial Russia were asked—or, more often, forced— to assume a common language
and religion as
the state created a territorial empire spanning a huge landmass and populated by
a diverse array of European and Asian peoples, who differed profoundly among
themselves in religion, way of life, and relationship to Russian authority
(Remington).
In this complicated situation, the suppression of ethnicity existed alongside the manipulation of
identity. Hence, ethnic groups were asked to identify themselves as citizens of the Russian
Empire and nothing more.
In 1917, the Russian Revolution and the coming of Soviet rule led to a sea change in
relations between ethnic groups and the state. Whereas previous Russian governments had
promoted a purely Russian identity over all others, the Soviet Empire was prevented from doing
so, due to the simple fact that it was comprised of multiple national republics. Therefore, the
Soviet government chose to actively employ its ethnic diversity as a tool for controlling its
citizenry. During the 20th century, entire communities were invented for political purposes,
cultural groups were granted superficial autonomy, and ethnicities were erased from the record
books (See Figure 1.1). In the most tragic cases, attempts were made to exterminate entire
populations, as with the Ukrainians during the Holodomor28. Thereby, the Soviet period both

28

A deliberate, Soviet-created famine that nearly wiped out the USSR’s Ukrainian population in 1932 and 1933.
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inflamed and confused ethnic identity. In addition, it caused inhabitants of the Russian region to
view central authority as

The Historic Experience of
Russian Minorities
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Figure 1.1

elongated cultural trial. The process of constant ethnic manipulation had created an environment
in which self-identity was confusing at best and dangerous at worst. Post-Soviet leaders were
charged with the difficult task of assessing this confusing situation and utilizing it as a means of
organization. In the end, leaders designed a federal
state consisting of 88 units, each belonging to one of

Categories of Federal Units
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several categories of autonomy and composition (see
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2
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Table 1.1

Number

21

Table 1.1). Of the 88 federal units, 31 exist as ethnic
regions with a specific titular nationality29.
History’s Continuing Relevance. In the
decade and a half since its creation, the world has
witnessed the maturation of the Federation as regions
have worked alongside Moscow in developing the
larger Russian sphere. The regions have diverged in
identity and behavior, leading to the conclusion that
modern Russia is first and foremost a federation.

This federal structure has had two concrete effects on the nature of the Russian state.
First, the Russian Federation is home to a large collection of independent political bodies.
For members of the business and political spheres, this means that one cannot merely consider a
commitment to Russia but to Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Komi or Chechnya as well. A clear example
29

A political map representing Russia’s federal structure can be found in Appendix A.
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of the unique political situations found throughout Russia is the region of Kalmykia. Since its first
national elections in 1993, the region has been under the rule of President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov.
Mr. Ilyumzhinov has compiled a list of actions that range from the irresponsible to the bizarre: he
has abolished the parliament, altered the constitution, threatened to turn the region into an
independent tax haven, and single-handedly orchestrated the construction of Chess City (a 50million dollar recreation complex on the outskirts of the capital city). President Ilyumzhinov’s
behavior, coupled with Moscow’s inability and apparent unwillingness to interfere with his
actions, clearly demonstrate the bizarre and troublesome nature of regional politics in Russia.
A second and far more pressing concern, however, is the humanitarian cost that federally
based regional conflict often extols. Statistics regarding regional conflict in Chechnya alone are
staggering: 500,000 civilian refugees, symptoms of physical or emotional distress among 86% of
the population, 25,000 troop deaths, and perhaps 250,000 total casualties. Sadly, modern Russia
plays witness to similar violent conflicts with unacceptable frequency and often manages these
situations without international scrutiny. No explanation or rationalization is necessary to prove
the urgency of these cases—plainly stated, men, women, and children are dying due to the
conflict that often consumes Russia’s regions. Federal relations play a central role in fueling these
tragic events. Therefore, a thorough understanding of regional aggression is an urgent necessity.

Russia
Russia as an
EthnoEthno- Federal Research Project
The Study of Ethnic Federalism and the Russian State
Ethno-federal studies. Previous scholarship regarding ethnic federations can be divided
into two subtly different areas of emphasis. The first vein includes those studies that primarily
address minorities (Saideman 1997; Wright, Jr., 1991; Brancati 2006; Hale, 2004). The second
includes research that is more focused on federations (Coakley 1992; Ellingsen 2000). Both of
these schools rely heavily on the groundbreaking research of William Riker30 and have built upon
both his and other studies in order to analyze the complex relationship between governance and
ethnicity.
Study of the Russian Federation. A large number of area studies have been conducted
regarding Russia and its behavior as an ethnic federation. Russia’s unique post-Communist
situation has offered scholars a chance to analyze the behavior of ethnic groups, both in the

30

Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, 1964.
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current Federation (Bahry et al. 2005; Zassorin 2000) and in conjunction with its Soviet history
(Hanson 1998; Tishkov 1999). These studies have confirmed the more general conclusions of
ethnic research by showing that ethnicity still matters in modern Russia.
The emergence of the Russian Federation has also provided scholars with an opportunity
to observe and critique the way in which a developing federal state matures and behaves (Gibson
2001; Herd 1999; Lynn et al. 1997). Specifically, many studies have analyzed the negotiation of
Russia’s unique regional constitutions (Filippov et al. 1998; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Chebankova
2005). Researchers have also documented national development in order to compare the nature of
Russia’s federation with that of its communist predecessor (Alexseev 2001; Drobizheva 2005;
Hale 2000). Lastly, there exists a group of scholars who have chosen to focus their research
squarely on Russian regions. Their studies assess the region’s role and behavior as part of the
larger federal unit (Treisman 1997; Dowley 1998; Bahry 2005). This collection of research
clearly demonstrates that federal regions are independent actors for whom unique economic and
political situations lead to diverse actions.
Four Conclusions. Researchers have therefore established a number of clear notions
regarding the Russian Federation. The following conclusions can be seen as the first four pieces
of the puzzle being confronted:
1. Cultural identity still matters in modern Russia.
2. Ethno-federalism often breeds ethnic conflict.
3. Modern economic and political factors vary among Russia’s federal units.
4. Two prominent schools of thought exist with regards to ethno-federal conflict:
primordialism and bargaining theory.
The fourth and final conclusion is most pertinent to this research. Indeed, it is by testing
these two schools against one another that this study hopes to establish a more reliable method of
analyzing center/periphery conflict in modern Russia.

Ancient Bonds: Primordialism
Researchers and pundits often argue that ethnic conflicts stem primarily from endemic
qualities held by distinct cultural groups. Lists of the relevant dimensions of ethnicity typically
include salient cultural aspects such as appearance, religion, language, custom, and history31.
Primordial (or “essentialist”) theory relies on the notion that these cultural identifiers determine
the nature of the relationship between actors. It is also important to understand the role that
31

“Primordial Ties”, Geertz.
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minority or majority status plays in a region’s behavior; indeed, while all ethnicities are
considered minorities on the national level, only some constitute majorities within their titular
region. Primordial theory suggests that these majority groups will behave more aggressively,
emboldened by their apparent primacy.
Primordialists assume a level of inexpugnability when referring to ethnicity; they often
assert that, “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on… have ineffable, and at times
overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves [Emphasis added]” (Geertz, 42). Moreover,
they presume that this aspect of society will inevitably influence government and politics. Such
an influence will occur when an ethnic group recognizes or believes that it is somehow different
than the main national ethnicity. This belief will lead them to behave in a way that attempts to
manage the effects of their “otherness”.
In keeping with this theory, primordialists have argued that Russia’s status as a
multiethnic region continues to determine its political momentum in the most basic of ways
(Bahry 2005; Coakley 1992; Drobezheva 2005; Ellingsen 2000; Gibson, 2001; Hale 2004; and
Hughes 2002). Primordial scholars believe that the sordid history of ethnicity in the Russian state
manifested itself when groups began to identify themselves publicly during the perestroika
period. This is a logical statement if one accepts primordialism’s basic tenets; indeed, “the
argument that ‘repressed’ nationalisms inevitably reemerged the moment that Gorbachov
removed the coercive controls formerly imposed… fits logically with a view of ethnicity as
somehow fundamental to human social identity” (Hanson, 4). Consequentially, scholars of the
primordial school discount the importance of contemporary factors when considering regional
conflict; rather, they posit that Russia’s federal system is inexorably linked to ethnicity as a
means of organization.

Titular Nationality Population
As a Part of Regional Population

theory is based upon a
false

premise;

a

large

amount of reliable data
demonstrates
continuing

the
diversity

of

ethnic groups in Russia
(see Figure 1.2). Indeed,
the very existence of such

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Ad
yg
Ba
e
sh A a
k o lt
rto ai
s
Bu tan
r
y
Ch a
e tia
Ch chn
uv ya
a
D shi
ag a
Ka
ba In est
r d gu an
i n sh
o - et
K
B ia
ar
al
ac
ha K kar
y- alm ia
Ch y
e r k ia
ke
ss
K ia
Kh are
ak lia
as
sia
Ko
No
M mi
rth
a
Os Mo r i E
se rd l
tia ov
Sa -A ia
kh la
a- ni
Ya a
Ta kut
tar ia
st
an
T
Ud uv
m a
ur
tia

not argue that primordial

Percentage of Total Regional Population
Held by Titular Nationality

This paper does

Source: The Statesman’s Yearbook

Figure 1.2
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diverse characteristics is precisely what makes this research possible. Previous studies have also
demonstrated ethnicity’s indirect effect on elite behavior (Treisman 1997) and political culture
(Zassorin 2000). However, this study seeks to show that ethnic characteristics, while evident, do
not themselves lead to regional aggression.

Contemporary Powers: Bargaining Theory
Scholars of the bargaining (or “instrumentalist”) school have argued that all political
entities ought to be viewed as rational actors. This leads to the basic premise of bargaining
theory: that actors, and in this case regions, will engage in conflict only when the rewards of
conflict outweigh the risks. Bargaining theory argues that all parties approach the table in an
attempt to benefit and that, furthermore, they do so only after having completed an analysis of
their own position. Such an analysis will, presumably, lead to their acceptance of a rational
strategy in terms of costs and benefits.
According to instrumentalists, the analysis performed by regions involves a review of
their economic and political “bargaining chips”. Useful factors include such measures as
international economic influence, natural resource potential and geographic importance. In cases
in which these factors are present, leaders will likely realize that their economic might allows
them to realistically challenge central authority. Such regions will decide that they have enough
bargaining chips to win a given argument; therefore, they will act confidently and aggressively
towards the center. A second possible outcome of such an analysis is that regions may realize the
negligibility of their potential loss. In this situation, governments will decide that having so few
bargaining chips at the outset of interactions means that they have nothing to lose by offending
central authority. However, in either of these situations, regions behave in a rational manner after
completing a concrete analysis.
Bargaining theory’s accuracy in describing Russian affairs has been corroborated in
previous research; studies have shown that the possession of some type of bargaining advantage
greatly affects regional behavior in Russia (Dowley 1998; Hanson 1998; Herd 1999; and Lynn et
al. 1997). In fact, bargaining scholars have even offered a counter-explanation for Russia’s
“ethnic revival” by writing, “[the situation] gave the impression that here there was a return to
tribal tradition and to tribal separatism when in fact tribalism in the contemporary situation was
one type of political grouping within the framework of the new state” (Cohen, 83). Data also
show that the economic situations of the regions are exceedingly diverse and therefore lend
themselves to an effective analysis of differentiation in bargaining power (see Figures 1.3 and
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1.4). By connecting bargaining theory to regional aggression, this study takes the next logical
step in this field of research.
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Testing Conflict among Russian Regions:
Methods & Models
Selecting the Most Appropriate Cases
The first issue that must be confronted is case selection. This study recognizes that, in
order to accurately test the hypotheses, cases must be (1) autonomous, (2) ethnically based, and
(3) similar and numerous enough to ensure reliable results. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation
is composed of 88 highly diverse subjects; therefore, it is logistically impossible to collect the
necessary data for all cases. It is also apparent that many of the federal member states do not
possess the resources or even the authority required to behave aggressively towards the center.
Therefore, this study selects the 21 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation as its case
set32. These 21 cases boast a high level of autonomy, an ethnic basis, and the amount of available
data necessary to conduct the intended research. In addition, this study will gain the increased
reliability that stems from investigating an entire universe of cases (all 21 autonomous regions).

32

A full list of the cases can be found in Appendix B.
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The Research Design Model
Operationalization of the suggested concepts will require extensive intuitive reasoning.
In order to accurately capture the complexity of the referenced ideas, indices will be constructed
as a proxy for each of the main independent variables (primordialism and bargaining theory) and
the dependent variable (regional aggression). The following research model will be utilized in
order to test the main hypothesis, which is that bargaining theory will be more strongly
associated with regional aggression than will primordialism and will, therefore, more accurately
predict regional stability:

Independent Variable 1

Independent Variable 2

Primordialism

Bargaining Theory

Primordial Hypotheses

Bargaining Hypotheses

Primordial Indicators

Bargaining Indicators

Primordial Index

Bargaining Index
Tests of
Association

Regional Aggression Index
Dependent Variable

Aggressive Behavior
The Investigatory Schema:
Primordialism versus Bargaining Theory
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The Testing Schedule
This study’s use of a tiered measurement system—one that utilizes both individual
indicators and additive indices— allows for a sequence of increasingly pertinent tests. First, in
the Pre-test Phase, the study will construct an accurate measure of the dependent variable. Phase
One will include a preliminary analysis of the six individual indicators. Lastly, in Phase Two, the
study will use the results of the preliminary investigations to construct its main indices and test
the main hypothesis. Therefore, the schedule of tests is:
Pre-test Phase
1. Operationalization and Measurement of the Dependent Variable
Phase One
2. Bivariate Analysis of the Individual Indicators
3. Eta33 (η) Analysis of the Individual Indicators
Phase Two
4. Construction of the Main Indices
5. Bivariate Analysis of the Indices
6. Linear Regression Analysis of the Indices

PrePre- Test Phase:
Measuring Aggressive Behavior
Operationalizing Regional Aggression. The operationalization and measurement of
aggression poses two puzzles. The first is, of course, which indicators will provide an accurate
measure of regional aggression; for instance, this study must ensure that it is measuring
aggressive behavior towards the center and not from it. The second puzzle is how best to choose
these variables so that all forms of aggression are accurately accounted for.
This study confronts the first puzzle by reviewing past research that utilizes federal and
regional aggression as a variable. A review of the existing literature suggests five reliable means
of operationalization:
Timing of region’s declaration of sovereignty34 (SOVER). This indicator measures the
political aggression shown by the region during the transitory phase of the development of the
*

Russian state, using rankings created by Triesman .
33

Eta is a test of association commonly used when the dependent variable is interval in nature and the independent
variable is categorical. η2 can be used as a proxy for r2.
34
Explanations of this and all other data manipulations can be found in Appendix C.
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Index of Constitutional Aggression (CONST). This indicator represents a measure of the
amount of aggression encapsulated in the bilateral constitution negotiated by the region and the
federal authority. It is constructed through a content analysis, which includes a review of a study
that was completed by Stoner-Weiss in 1999.
Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion (WAR). This value is utilized to take account of
any instances of actual physical violence that have occurred in the regions and uses data collected
by the Minorities At Risk project since 1991.
Aggression in Elite Activity (ELITE). In order to measure the level of aggression shown
by regional elites towards Moscow, this study will rely upon the extensive content analysis
completed by Dowley*, who then translated her findings into the scale that is directly borrowed.
Instances of Assertion of Legal and Resource Rights (LEG.ASN/RES.ASN). Again using
data collected by Daniel Triesman for his 1997 study, a dummy variable is created for each type of
assertion, with a score of 0 denoting no assertion and 1 indicating at least one instance of assertion.

A second puzzle that requires close attention is how this research can best measure each
of the preceding indicators in appropriate proportion. For example, when considering a region’s
overall aggressive activity, an instance of armed aggression towards federal authority should
clearly carry greater weight than an assertion of resource rights. This study therefore utilizes an
index that includes each indicator along with an assigned weight, which is represented as a
cofactor. The Aggregate Center/Periphery Aggression Index (ACPAI) is
(5*WAR) + (4*ELITE) + (3*CONST) + (3*SOVER) + (1*LEG.ASN) + (1*RES.ASN).
The ACPIA Described.
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*

For specific figures and scales, see Appendix D.
The Center/Periphery Aggression Index possesses a mean of 30.94, a standard deviation of 12.16, and a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.555 (Cronbach’s alpha, which is measured on a 0 to 1 scale, indicates the extent to which a set of items can
be treated as measuring a single latent variable).
35
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Phase One:
Assessing the Individual
Hypotheses and Indicators
Operationalizing the Primordial School
The study derives the following set of auxiliary hypotheses from primordial theory:
H1.1 = Titular nationalities that have been historically autonomous will show
more aggression in regional relations with the center.
H1.2 = Those titular nationalities that do not share the Russian Orthodox
religion will be more likely to show aggression in center-periphery relations.
H1.3 = Those titular nationalities that reside in a region in which they constitute
a majority will show more aggression in relations with the center.
Each of these hypotheses captures an essential aspect of the theory that has been outlined
in previous primordial literature. The first hypothesis assesses a key aspect of the historical
experience of each ethnicity; the second takes account of ethnic religion (which, it is believed,
corresponds closely with other cultural identifiers); and the third measures each ethnicity’s
demographic status in their region and, thereby, the potential impact of their activity as an ethnic
group.
Indicators that correspond with each primordial hypothesis are then identified. The choice
of such a system requires that each indicator move in the same direction; that is, a higher score
has to indicate a higher degree of primordial differentiation from the center. It is also worth
noting that primordial theory, due to its strictly ethnic nature, cannot be accurately tested through
an assessment of the actual regions. Therefore, this study’s ‘primordial’ variables indirectly
measure the Russian regions by measuring each region’s titular nationality. The following
indicators are selected for their intuitive connection to the hypotheses and their frequent inclusion
in the literature:
Majority or Minority Status (MIN.MAJ). This indicator is a dummy variable that denotes
whether or not the titular nationality for which the region was created exists as a regional majority
or a minority. Those ethnicities with majority status receive a score of 0 and those with minority
status receive a score of 1. This classification is based upon data collected from the Statesman’s
Yearbook.
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Religious Status (REL). Data is collected regarding the faith to which each region’s titular
nationality generally ascribes. This information is found using the Minorities at Risk data set and is
given as a dummy variable, with 0 signifying adherence to the Russian Orthodox faith and a score
of 1 denoting ascription to any other religion.
Historical Autonomy (AUT). In order to gauge the historical perspective of each titular
nationality, each region is assigned a dummy variable that signifies its historical status as an
autonomous state. Research is performed on each region’s titular nationality and, subsequently,
each region is assigned a score of either 0 or 1, with 1 signifying that an ethnicity enjoyed
autonomy within an independent state at any point in history.

Measuring Bargaining Theory
The auxiliary hypotheses that this study derives from bargaining theory are:
H2.1 = Regions with central capitals that have a larger population and a more
urbanized society will be more aggressive in center-periphery relations.
H2.2 = Regions that contain oil production or transport facilities will be more
aggressive in center-periphery relations.
H2.3 = Regions whose economies are more engaged as foreign and domestic
traders will show more aggression in their relations with central authority.
Each of these statements corresponds with an essential component of regional bargaining
position. The first measures the development of each region, by the assumption that large urban
centers suggest internal growth; the second hypothesis takes account of oil production and
transportation, which plays a critical role in the larger Russian economy; and the third assesses
each regions status in the domestic and international economy. The following indicators are
utilized to measure the suggested concepts:
Population of the Regional Capital (CAP.POP).

As a measure of the region’s

urbanization and development, the population of each capital city is found. These figures are then
used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values representing a larger size.
Economic Interaction (ECON.INT). In order to assess each region as an economic actor,
data provided by the Bank of Russia is utilized. This study gathers the figures for each region in
four categories: A) federal rubles borrowed by private enterprises, B) federal rubles borrowed by
public enterprises, C) total foreign sales per month and D) total foreign purchases per month.
Oil Resources (OIL). Information regarding the location of key oil production sites and
various oil transportation structures is collected from the Environmental Information Agency.
Regions are then assigned a score of 0 if no oil production or transportation takes place within the
region, 1 if the region is home to some form of oil transportation structure, and 2 if the region
contains oil production sites.
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Tests of the Six Indicators
The first procedure, a test of
bivariate

correlation,

association between the dependent
variable and each of the six
individual indicators. The results,
which can be found in Table 1.2, are
most

useful

when

Bivariate Correlations

measures

grouped

according to the theory from which
they are derived. This division into
primordial and bargaining indictors

Pearson’s R
Primordial Indicators
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic
Minority or Majority
Titular Nationality’s Sharing of the
Russian Orthodox Faith
Historical Autonomous Status
Bargaining Indicators
Population of Capital City
Presence of Oil or oil Pipeline
Economic Interaction
* -- Significance at the .05 level

will later allow for the construction

Sig.

.469*

.016

.289
.334

.102
.069

.470*
.319
.454*

.016
.080
.019

Table 1.2

of the main indices.
When considering the primordial variables, it is clear that the most strongly correlated
indicator is an ethnic group’s majority or minority status. Indeed, none of the other primordial
variables show a significant correlation with regional aggression. Therefore, the possession of a
non-majority language or religion does not appear to have a significant influence on the amount
of aggression with which a region behaves. In sum, the strongest primordial determinant of
regional aggression is whether or not the titular nationality resides in a region in which its
members constitute a majority.
The results of bivariate tests involving the bargaining indicators offer further
opportunities for analysis. It is clear, though not surprising, that regional aggression is most
strongly correlated with economic interaction and the volume of the capital population. Since
these indicators take direct account of a region’s economic development, the findings agree with
the main hypothesis. It is equally noteworthy, however, that there appears to be a surprisingly
weak relationship between regional aggression and involvement in the oil industry.
The study next conducts an auxiliary test of the indicators using an eta measurement. In
this research, the eta tests are performed in order to simply reinforce the results of the bivariate
analysis. All eta values mirror the findings of the primary tests; thus, the scores appear to
increase the validity of previous results36.

36

Results of the eta test can be found in Appendix E.
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Analysis of Phase One

It should first be noted that all relationships move in the directions predicted by the
hypotheses, and that three of the six hypotheses receive significant support from the results (see
Table 1.3).
Second, majority status appears to be the only primordial variable that correlates with
regional aggression at a significant level. This is interesting in that majority status is also the
primordial indicator that most readily fits with the arguments presented by bargaining theory.
Indeed, this study argues only that majority or minority status does not independently lead to
conflict; it remains quite possible that population demographics exert a strong influence and make
the mobilization of ethnicity a more realistic option by reducing the costs and increasing the
benefits of conflict.
Third, the weak correlation shown between oil production and regional aggression
requires attention. This finding poses a dilemma for those who would argue that oil is a frequent
cause of conflict between the center and periphery. Of course, the results could be due to the fact
that the possession of oil leads to interference from central authority to which regions are unable
to respond. It must be remembered that this study only measures regional aggression towards the
center; therefore, it could not account for such conflict even if it did exist. Whether or not this is
the case, it is worth noting that regions that are active in the production and transport of oil are no
more likely to act aggressively towards central authority than those that are not.

Summary of Auxiliary Hypotheses

Majority Status

Primordial
Indcators

Indicator

H1.1
H1.2

Religion

H1.3

Historical Autonomy

Bargaining
Indcators

Hn

H2.1

Capital Population

H2.2

Oil Production

H2.3

Economic Interaction

* At the .05 level

Table 1.3

Correct
Direction?

Significant?*

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
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Phase Two:
Testing the Rival Schools
Constructing the Indices
Primordialism. The Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index37 (APII) is constructed in
accordance with the following two lessons, which were taken from the preliminary tests: (1)
status as an ethnic minority or majority appears to be the most influential and, therefore, the most
important of the three indicators and (2) while both religion and historical autonomy have weak
correlations with aggression, religion’s correspondence with other cultural identifiers (language,
culture, custom) require that it be more heavily considered. When scaled in accordance with these
lessons and combined into a single index, the measures accurately portray the identity of each
titular nationality. The APII can be represented as
(6 * REL) + (6 *MIN.MAJ) + (3 * AUT)
Bargaining Theory. The Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index38 (ABII) is constructed
based upon the following observations: (1) oil does not have a very strong influence on the
bargaining position of each region and (2) both the population of the capital city and the level of
economic interaction have significant and strong correlation with regional aggression. In order to
account for the apparent variance in influence among these indicators, this study chooses to
structure the ABII in the following manner:
(3 * CAP.POP) + (3 * ECON.INT) + (OIL)

Testing the Indices
Bivariate Tests. The initial test of the indices utilizes simple bivariate correlation (see
Table 1.4). The results show that

Bivariate Correlations
Pearson's R

both of the indices possess a
significantly

strong

level

of

association with the dependent
variable. Moreover, the findings
support

this

research’s

main

Indices
Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index
Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index
*-- Significance at the .05 level
**-- Significance at the .001 level

.524**
.486*

Table 1.4
37
38

The APII shows a mean of 7.429, a standard deviation of 5.8187, and a Cronbach’s alpha of .580.
The ABII possesses a mean of 18.167, a standard deviation of 7.1438, and a Cronbach’s alpha of .652

Sig.
.004
.016
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hypothesis: when operationalized, bargaining theory is more strongly associated with regional
aggression than is primordial theory, though by a relatively small margin.
Linear Regression Analysis. The study next conducts a more rigorous, head-to-head test
of the indices using the linear regression method. This procedure allows for a comparison of each
index’s influence when controlling for its counterargument; therefore, if consistent with the
results of previous tests, these findings will greatly increase this study’s confidence in its
findings. The results of the OLS test are presented in Table 1.5.
An initial consideration is that a single model that includes both independent variables
accounts for roughly half of the variance in the dependent variable (R2= .503); this association is
also highly significant (nearly at the .001 level). These findings support the assumption that
primordial and bargaining indicators each play a large role in determining regional aggression.
The most valuable results of any linear regression test are the beta weights. Through
these values, the OLS procedure allows for a direct comparison of each index’s effect when
controlling for its rival theory; therefore, the results are critical to this study. One of the strengths
of beta weights as a tool of measurement is that these values do not require much analysis; quite
simply, the Bargaining Index shows a larger beta weight than the Primordial Index. Therefore,
these values demonstrate that
bargaining theory is more

Linear Regression Model Summary
R
R Square
Significance

strongly

.709
.503
.002

aggressive
when
ethnicity’s

Linear Regression Results
Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index
Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index
**-- Significance at the .001 level

Beta Weights
0.517**
0.478**

Sig.
.006
.010

correlated

behavior—even
controlling
influence.

for
In

addition, these results are
significantly correlated with
the dependent variable and,
therefore, allow for a high
level of confidence.

Table 1.5

with
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Analysis of Phase Two
This research’s main hypothesis was that bargaining theory would be more strongly
associated with regional aggression than would primordial theory. The hypothesis was most
succinctly and directly verified through the linear regression analysis, which clearly showed that
the Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index did indeed have a stronger correlation with the
Center/Periphery Aggression Index. It should be noted, however, that the difference between the
indices’ beta weights was relatively small; this similar level of influence requires further
investigation. Regardless, the findings support the study’s main hypothesis.
Two useful conclusions can be made based upon the findings. The first conclusion is that
in order to accurately predict regional stability in the Russian Federation, actors should assess
the given region’s “bargaining chips”. The second and more generalizable conclusion is that
cultural differences are not the strongest determinants of conflict in Russian center/periphery
relations. In other words, this study disputes Geertz’s assertion that ethnic characteristics “have
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” when considering
federal relations in modern Russia (42).

Reconsidering Ethnicity’s Role
in Modern Russia
Questions for Further Research. The results of this study suggest that, when considering
the Russian Federation, there is less direct causality between primordial factors and regional
aggression than has previously been suggested. This statement was supported by an investigation
of the 21 autonomous federal regions and their corresponding titular nationalities. In addition, the
investigation revealed a significantly strong relationship between leverage at the bargaining table
and aggressive behavior towards the center. Therefore, this research achieved its goal of showing
that regional conflict in the Russian Federation is most strongly governed by the rules of
bargaining theory.

In this sense, it brings greater clarity to the discussion of Russian

center/periphery conflict. However, its conclusions also suggest several new questions.
Investigating Bargaining Variable Interaction. Future studies should first address the way
in which bargaining indicators interact in order to determine regional behavior39. While it is
important that their influence as a theoretically linked group of characteristics has been verified,
interaction among the variables almost certainly varies among regions. A fruitful question for

39

A cursory investigation of this issue can be found in Appendix F.
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future study would be how bargaining indicators enhance or negate other regional characteristics.
Accounting for Primordialism’s Influence. Vastly more important, however, is the need
to account for the continued influence of primordial variables. Indeed, it should be recalled that
(1) this study found a robust and statistically significant associations between the APII and
center/periphery conflict and (2) that roughly 50% of the variance in the dependent variable is yet
to be accounted for.

Therefore, it may be most fruitful to consider ways of synthesizing

primordialism and bargaining theory. A previous study40 took the first step in explaining the link
between primordialism and bargaining theory by hypothesizing that “[ethnic] stratification has no
direct effect on an ethnic group’s propensity to engage in collective action, but that its influence is
mediated by the establishment of ethnic organizations or quasi-groups [Emphasis added]” (431).
According to this hypothesis, it is probable that primordial variables, when mobilized as
“bargaining chips”, have an extremely large influence on regional behavior. The suggested
relationship between primordialism, bargaining, and regional aggression is illustrated in the
following figure:

Primordial Hypotheses

Primordial Indicators

Comprehensive Effect
of All Variables

Bargaining Hypotheses

become

Bargaining Indicators

Bargaining Index

Regional Aggression Index

The Suggested Relationship between
Ethnicity, Political Bargaining, & Center/Periphery conflict

Hechter sums up the potential of such a synthesis by stating that it “offers the prospect of
arriving at predictive statements, rather than at the post hoc descriptions [of ethnic behavior] for
which sociologists have had to settle too frequently in the past” (91). Therefore, future studies
should investigate the behavior of primordial characteristics in the arena of bargaining theory.
Researchers should address how regional leaders most frequently mobilize ethnic identity, the

40

“A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action’”, Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum.
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way in which ethnicity makes its presence felt, and the process by which the mobilization of
culture leads to center/periphery conflict. The verification of these dynamics would render
bargaining theory a much stronger predictor of center/periphery conflict by allowing theorists to
acknowledge the influence of culture.
Conclusions. More than a thousand years of Russian history has proven that culture
remains a force that, when mobilized, is capable of undermining central authority. Conversely,
that same history also demonstrates that ethnic characteristics can actually be utilized as a means
of organization and governance. Indeed, Russia’s tumultuous past provides countless examples
of ethnicity’s dichotomous role as both a precursor for peace and a magnet for conflict. Perhaps,
if scholars are one day able to fully understand culture and its influence on behavior, regional
actors will find themselves better able to manage culture and stifle its potentially violent
manifestations. Such capabilities would almost certainly lead to a more stable future for the
Russian Federation and its 88 regions.
This research provides ample evidence to suggest that it is time to reexamine ethnicity’s
role in Russian center/periphery conflict; clearly, a new understanding of ethnic identity is
necessary in order to place culture into a rational and modern context. This study merely takes
the first step in the proposed investigation by demonstrating that, while culture continues to be of
the utmost importance in the Russian Federation, any theory of ethno-federal conflict that
emphasizes inexpugnable ethnic characteristics over the rational nature of modern politics is
misguided and incomplete. If supported in future research, the proposed synthesis of ethnic
identity and rational behavior will gain prominence as an accurate model of federal relations in
modern Russia.
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Appendices
Appendix A– Administrative Divisions of the Russian Federation

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Russian-regions.png

Appendix B– Full List of Cases
1. Adygea
2. Altai
3. Bashkortostan
4. Buryatia
5. Dagestan
6. Ingushetia
7. Kabardino-Balkaria
8. Kalmykia
9. Karachay-Cherkessia
10. Karelia
11. Komi

12. Mari El
13. Mordovia
14. Sakha (Yakutia)
15. North Ossetia-Alania
16. Tatarstan
17. Tuva
18. Udmurtia
19. Khakassia
20. Chechnya
21. Chuvashia
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Appendix C– Explanation of Indicator Manipulations
Index of Constitutional Aggression
The index was created by assigning 1 point for a region having demanded inclusion in the
first round of treaty negotiations and 1 additional point for each instance of discrepancy
between federal and regional law enshrined in the constitution.
Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion
This project assigned each region a score between 0 and 3. A score of 0 signified no
instances of protest, war, or rebellion; a score of 1 signified at least one instance of
protest/rebellion; a score of 2 signified at least one instance of war; and a score of 3
signified instances of both protest/rebellion and war.
Timing of Region’s Declaration of Sovereignty
Treisman’s rankings assign each region a number based upon the quickness with which
they declared their sovereignty. The rankings, which are on a scale of 0-11, were recoded
into a 0-5 scale by dividing each score by 2, and rounding up when necessary.
Economic Interaction
In order to accurately gauge the trend of these figures, this study averaged the figures for
January 2000 and December 2005 in each category. After transferring each of the four
figures onto a 5-point scale, this research chose to combine all resulting scores in order to
construct a comprehensive index of economic activity. The resulting scores were again
used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values denoting a higher volume of
economic interaction.
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Appendix D– Borrowed Data Sources
Regional Elite Behavior– Dowley, 1998.

Region

Score

N

Adygea

3.62

8

Altai

3.33

Bashkortostan

Score

N

Karelia

3.56

25

6

Khakassia

3.64

11

4.00

46

Komi

3.44

16

Buryatia

3.50

15

Mari El

3.86

7

Chechnya

4.62

62

Mordovia

3.20

15

Chuvashia

3.62

13

North Ossetia-Alania

3.12

34

Dagestan

2.84

19

Sakha-Yakutia

3.68

41

Ingushetia

3.50

30

Tatarstan

4.33

43

Kabardino-Balkaria

3.05

21

Tuva

3.80

15

Kalmykia

3.29

17

Udmurtia

3.43

14

Karachay-Cherkessia

3.00

11

Timing of Regional Sovereignty– Triesman, 1997.

Region
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Appendix E— Results of the eta Test
Eta Values
Eta
Primordial Indicators
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic
Minority or Majority
Titular Nationalities Sharing of the Russian
Orthodox Faith
Titular Nationality's Historical Autonomous
Status
Bargaining Indicators
Total Population of the Capital City, 2002
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline
Combined Monthly Economic Interaction
*-- Significance at the .05 level

0.522*
.323
.288
.548
.400
.641

Appendix F— Interaction among Bargaining Variables
This study performed a brief, cursory analysis of the interaction between the three
bargaining indicators. Three models were created, with each model including one of three
possible pairings of bargaining indicators. The study then tested each two-indicator combination
for correlation with the dependent variable (R2) through the OLS method. In this way, the
research was able to assess which indicator pairings, if any, exert an exceedingly large influence
on regional aggression. The results are as follows:

Indicator Pairing

R2

Significance

Oil & Economic Interaction

0.275

.024

Oil & Capital Population

0.264

.055

Economic Interaction & Capital Population

0.250

.075

Clearly, none of the indicator pairings exerts a substantially greater influence on regional
aggression than any other. Therefore, a region that possesses oil and a high-level of economic
interaction will be no more likely to engage in conflict than will a region that possesses oil and a
large capital-city population. This basic investigation does not suggest that there is no particular
combination of “bargaining chips” that exert an exceedingly large influence on regional
aggression; it merely demonstrates that, among these three variables, there is no substantially
influential combination. In order to investigate the issue further, researchers should perform
similar analyses using larger pools of variables and more theoretically coherent models.
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